uniformly tight-lipped about the issue. 9 The proverbial cart was before the horse --there was no interdepartmental deliberation or coordination and the National Security Council had little, if any, involvement.
10
Furthermore, Congress had not been consulted on the Order prior to its release and was caught flat-footed. As early as September, the Senate Judiciary Committee had received press inquiries on military "tribunals" but was unaware of any action by the Administration in this regard. 11 The Committee, acting on the media's information, did submit written follow-up questions to Attorney General John Ashcroft after his testimony before the Committee on 25
September. One question specifically asked whether the Attorney General "favor[ed] using the military tribunal system as an alternative to civilian criminal trials" and if the President were considering this option. 12 The response by the Assistant Attorney General on the 18 th of October was evasive. He stated it would be "inappropriate for the Department to make premature pronouncements" about the anticipated use of commissions, but did note there existed precedent for commissions and assured the Committee that "any recommendation of the Department concerning [commissions] will reflect careful consideration of the important constitutional issues presented."
13
Less than a month later, the President issued his Military Order. The Senate Judiciary
Committee was first informed of the Order by the Wall Street Journal. 14 The Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Patrick Leahy, had to withhold comment on the Order until he had seen a copy the following day. 15 Despite long days of intense negotiations in October 9 Attempts to interview individuals at the N.S.C., the Department of Justice, and the DOD General Counsel's Office received similar replies: "We want to help you, but we can't. 
Key Positions on the President's Military Order
The hearings elicited a variety of arguments for and against the President's Military
Order. To summarize the key assertions: • The Constitution contemplated that Executive authority would expand during a time of national crisis or armed conflict, allowing swift action and unity of purpose. 24 Attorney General Ashcroft testified that "our constitutional founders didn't expect us to have a war conducted by committee" and that "the Constitution vests the President with the extraordinary and sole authority as Commander in Chief to lead our nation in times of war."
Pros

25
• There existed ample historical precedent and judicial authority supporting the use of commissions. Further, there is a favorable comparison of the commissions to prior and current international tribunals in terms of evidentiary standards, majority voting, and ability to close proceedings. The world has accepted these international tribunals as "full and fair trials."
• The commissions would protect participants and safeguard national security secrets, sources, and collection methods. Civil criminal trials and the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) are inadequate in these aspects. • Our system of justice will be on trial as much as any member of al Qaeda. The world will observe how fairly victor's justice will be meted out. The use of commissions sends the message that we have no confidence in our civil criminal system. The Order expressly denies certain fundamental rights, and anything that creates the appearance of second-rate justice will cause the U.S. to lose credibility and moral persuasion. Americans could then be similarly tried in foreign courts that afford little or no due process.
Cons
• Federal district courts have previously successfully prosecuted terrorists, safeguarded the participants, and protected classified information. The Government has failed to show that the CIPA is inadequate.
• Commissions will inhibit allied support, prevent the extradition of suspects, and diminish law enforcement cooperation.
• The Order violates international treaties such as the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 (Protection of Prisoners of War) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, both of which were ratified by the United States.
The Administration's Efforts at Damage Control
After noting the reaction to the Order, the Executive Branch initiated an effort to respond to the criticisms. On 19 November, the Justice Department sent lawyers over to Capitol Hill to assumed. Nevertheless, he was confident that the Administration could hold these commissions "under the full glare of the media in a manner that meets all legitimate concerns. Success depends upon [our] ability to show justice is in fact being done. In a very real sense, it is the American legal system, not just al Qaeda's leaders, that would be on trial."
38
The Outcome
It is apparent this unusual process has affected the policy. By the end of the hearings, all the Senators and witnesses agreed that there existed a requirement for the commissions. The question became not whether to have commissions, but what rules they should follow. The
Order, broad and vague in its terms, was fleshed out during the hearings, in press interviews, and as a result of the leak. One reporter commented that "the critics should take heart -and some of the credit" since it appears as though "the Administration has gone to great lengths to assure Additionally, the process has revealed how those arrested in the war against terrorism would be handled. The Justice Department will determine what to do with terrorist suspects captured in the U.S., the Defense Department will decide upon those captured in Afghanistan, and the State Department will handle those captured in other countries. 45 Secretary Rumsfeld divided the detainees into four groups:
• lower-level Afghan Taliban would be dealt with by Afghanistan;
• the U.S. would handle Afghan Taliban leaders;
• lower-level al Qaeda members would be returned to their country of origin, as long as the U.S. felt comfortable that their cases would be "properly" handled; and, The issue in Walker is not legal, it is political. In our attempts to fashion a system of justice that would guarantee the safety of those participating and not compromise intelligence,
Walker's situation split from the anticipated norm: he was a U.S. citizen. If Walker is tried in federal district court, some will complain about the disparate treatment between citizens and noncitizens. Others will say it weakens the Administration's claim that the commissions are necessary because of security concerns. The issue now is for the President to decide if he wants to expand the jurisdiction of the commissions to include U.S. citizens.
Moussaoui on the other hand, seemed like the perfect candidate for a military commission, yet the Attorney General recommended that he be tried in federal district court.
The President agreed after receiving assurances that there was a strong case against Moussaoui and that the evidence will not likely compromise intelligence sources or methods. 47 Senator
Lieberman has complained that this decision undermines the legitimacy of the commissions.
48
Most, however, see the decision as a reassuring signal that commissions will only be used in limited circumstances, which will help the Administration domestically and with our allies who had reservations about turning suspects over to the United States. 49 There will be continued resistance if the death penalty is sought. Spain has held 11 suspects, refusing to extradite them because of concerns they would face capital punishment. France likewise cautioned the U.S. that it would
